Nidec's 844 Quality Violations: Can Reform Survive the Company's New Cost-Centre Push
On 4 September 2026, Nidec confirmed 844 cases of quality-related misconduct identified by an external investigation committee. Of these, 805 were "4M change" violations — alterations to manufacturing conditions made without the customer sign-off the two sides had agreed on.…

On 4 September 2026, Nidec confirmed 844 cases of quality-related misconduct identified by an external investigation committee. Of these, 805 were "4M change" violations — alterations to manufacturing conditions made without the customer sign-off the two sides had agreed on. Coming after an earlier accounting scandal, the findings leave the motor maker — already placed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange's "Security on Alert" list — needing to prove it can turn its recovery pledges into practice.
Key points
- The external committee recognised 844 cases of quality-related misconduct (60 serious cases, 784 general) plus six cases of improper origin labelling.
- "4M change" violations — altering manufacturing conditions without customer re-approval — numbered 805, about 95% of the total; roughly 90% of all cases were concentrated in three business units.
- In the separate accounting scandal, the cumulative impact on net profit reached ¥160.7 billion; Nidec was placed on the exchange's Security on Alert list in October 2025 and has since paid no dividend, halted buybacks and delayed results.
- Both scandals trace to the same governance failure — an overriding drive to hit business targets — with quality assurance left subordinate to production and sales.
- The overhaul will be judged on whether quality assurance gains real authority, and whether that authority survives the cost pressure of Nidec's plan to run its factories as cost centres.
805 changes made without the customer's approval
Nidec disclosed the findings at a briefing held in Tokyo and online on 4 September 2026, presenting a report from an investigation committee of outside experts. The committee had confirmed the suspicions of quality misconduct that first surfaced in a group-wide "quality review" covering the company's production and development sites.
In all, 844 cases of quality-related misconduct were recognised: 60 "serious quality cases" with a larger impact on customers, and 784 "general" cases. A further six cases of improper labelling of a product's place of origin were identified separately.
The dominant category was the "4M change" violation, at 805 cases, or about 95% of the total. The 4Ms are the four factors that govern production conditions — Man, Machine, Material and Method. A basic rule of manufacturing is that any change to them requires the customer's prior approval, yet in most of these cases the step was skipped. Takeshi Miyake, Nidec's director, executive officer and chief supply-chain officer, said the rule for 4M changes — "an important agreement with the customer" — had been "treated lightly or allowed to become a formality within the organisation".
The misconduct was not spread evenly. About 90% of the 844 cases were concentrated in three business units handling high-volume products such as motors for home appliances and vehicles. Nidec says its technical and quality checks so far have found no issue affecting product safety, though two cases concerning product function remain under discussion with customers.
Accounting and quality: two failures, one governance root
This is not an isolated incident. It follows an accounting scandal, and the two failures grow from the same root.
In the accounting case, Nidec was alleged to have understated losses on acquisitions and other assets whose value had fallen, making profit look larger than it was. A third-party committee concluded that the cumulative impact on net profit reached ¥160.7 billion through the April–June quarter of 2025, from practices such as avoiding impairments on low-probability deals and excluding inventory that lacked asset value from valuation-loss recognition.
In response, the Tokyo Stock Exchange placed Nidec on its "Security on Alert" list in October 2025 — a measure applied when a listed company's internal controls are judged deficient. If improvement is not confirmed at a review, in principle a year later, the path can lead to delisting. Nidec suspended share buybacks the same month and paid no interim or year-end dividend for the year to March 2026. It has also delayed its April–June 2026 results, citing the time needed to examine the accounting and quality issues and a separate tariff inquiry.
What links the two is a culture that puts hitting business targets above all else. In the accounting case, pressure to meet operating-profit goals distorted how the field booked its numbers; in the quality case, the committee points to pressure on revenue and cost-cutting as the backdrop. To protect the figures, accounting deferred loss recognition and manufacturing skipped change procedures — different symptoms of the same governance failure. It reads as the side effect of the founder-driven, high-growth model surfacing on both fronts.
How cost targets pushed quality assurance into a subordinate role
The path by which 4M violations piled up can be traced from the committee's findings. Miyake said the serious cases shared a common backdrop: mismatches with customer agreements or certification standards, or shortfalls in process capability, that were "not resolved at an organisational level and were instead handled through improper workarounds".
Changing equipment or materials should trigger customer re-approval. But problems — inadequate process capability, an agreed standard that could not be met — were papered over on the floor rather than through the proper procedure. This is where the target culture bit. When cost and delivery goals are treated as absolute, quality assurance becomes subordinate to production and sales, and processing a change on the floor looks more "rational" than waiting for approval. Bad news travels upward less and less, and deviations from change control become routine. Internal convenience came before the promise made to the customer.
That the misconduct clustered in three business units fits the same logic. Motors for home appliances and vehicles are made in large volumes under fierce cost competition. Tight cost targets and short lead times are exactly the conditions in which change-control steps are most likely to be pushed aside, concentrating the misconduct. When President Mitsuya Kishida told the briefing he wanted Nidec to become "a company that puts the customer first, ahead of internal logic", he was acknowledging that this order of priorities had been reversed.
A "line-stop" power for quality — but the test is measurable
Nidec's recovery plan runs in three directions: systems, processes and culture. At its core are the independence of the quality-assurance function and an "absolute" authority to halt the line when a problem arises. A global quality-control headquarters will also run audits and monitoring. The "Bad News First" slogan is the mirror image of a past in which bad news was buried.
The direction is sound, but a declaration alone will not overturn a target culture. Its effectiveness can be measured against several checkable points. Does quality assurance hold personnel authority independent of production and sales, with a direct reporting line to top management? Is the line-stop power actually exercised when it collides with cost and delivery, and are those instances disclosed? Are whistle-blowers protected from retaliation? And how far do unapproved changes decline from here? Only when those numbers move can the system be judged to have moved from paper to practice.
There is also a tension that cannot be ignored. At the same briefing, Kishida said Nidec would begin managing its factories as cost centres. A framework that squeezes cost harder sits awkwardly against preventing misconduct that cost pressure itself produced. How the company tightens cost control while keeping a brake that stops cost from being used to sacrifice quality is the crux — and it is what will decide whether the plan is a slogan or something with substance.
What to watch: the 30 September results and the burden on customers
The near-term focus is clear. First is the impact figure to be shown at the results briefing on 30 September 2026. The correction of prior-year accounts and the cost of dealing with the quality misconduct will finally put a number on the hole in Nidec's finances.
Second is the listing review. The in-principle one-year review point, following the October 2025 designation, arrives in October 2026. If the exchange cannot judge the improvement in internal controls to be real, the risk of delisting becomes concrete.
Third is the burden that lands on customers and the ripple through supply chains. A 4M violation can force a customer into re-certification, tighter auditing and, in some cases, alternative sourcing or design changes. The severity varies by sector. Home-appliance work tends to require re-verification within a limited scope, whereas automotive parts face strict type-certification and functional-safety requirements, and a single lapse in change control can jeopardise an automaker's certification or halt supply. Which way the two unresolved cases fall will also shape the outline of the impact.
Nidec rose to become a global motor maker on founder-driven, high-speed growth — and the "hit-the-target" culture that powered that rise produced two scandals, in accounting and in quality. Whether its recovery is real will show not in slogans but in operation. The answer will come from the number disclosed on 30 September, and from whether cases accumulate in which quality assurance used its line-stop power against cost and delivery and management backed it.







